Secure communications guaranteeing reliability and privacy (without unproven assumptions) in networks with active adversaries has been an important research issue. It has been studied for point to point networks by Dolev-Dwork-Waarts-Yung (J. ACM 1993), Desmedt-Wang (Eurocrypt 2002), and Srinathan-Narayanan-Rangan (Crypto 2004). Dolev-Dwork-Waarts-Yung gave necessary and sufficient conditions for secure communication in networks with the condition that 1) all the channels are two-way; or 2) all the channels are one-way from the sender to the receiver. In this paper, we study the general case with a network modeled by a directed graph. In this general case, there are communication channels from the sender to the receiver and there are feedback channels from the receiver to the sender. We give necessary and sufficient bounds on the number of channels that are required from sender to receiver given a number of "feedback" channels from receiver to sender. We give these bounds for the case reliability is perfect, as well as for the case it is not perfect.
I. INTRODUCTION
S ECURE communications guaranteeing reliability and privacy (without unproven assumptions) in networks with active adversaries has been an important research issue. Original work on secure distributed computation assumed a complete graph for secure and reliable communication. Dolev, Dwork, Waarts, and Yung [5] considered secure communication in networks that are not necessarily complete. The tradeoff between network connectivity and secure communication has been studied extensively (see, e.g., [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] , [11] , [19] , [13] ). For example, Dolev [4] and Dolev et al. [5] showed that, in the case of Byzantine faults, reliable communication is achievable only if the system's network is connected. They also showed that if all the paths are one way, then connectivity is necessary and sufficient for reliable and private communications. However, they did not prove any results for the general case when there is a certain number of directed paths in one direction and another number of directed paths in the other direction. While undirected graphs correspond naturally to the case of pairwise two-way channels, directed graphs do not correspond to the case of all-one-way or all-two-way Manuscript channels considered in [5] , but to the mixed case where there are some paths in one direction and some paths in the other direction. In this paper, we will initiate the study in this direction by showing what can be done with a general directed graph. Note that this scenario is important in practice, in particular, when the network is not symmetric. For example, a channel from to is cheap and a channel from to is expensive but not impossible. Another example is that has access to more resources than does. Specifically, we will show the following necessary and sufficient result: If is the number of feedback channels then perfectly secure message transmission from the sender to the receiver is possible if and only if there are forward channels. Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [10] , Franklin and Yung [8] , Franklin and Wright [7] , and Wang and Desmedt [20] have studied secure communication and secure computation in multirecipient (multicast) models. In a "multicast channel" (such as Ethernet), one participant can send the same message-simultaneously and privately-to a fixed subset of participants. Franklin and Yung [8] have given a necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to exchange private messages in multicast models in the presence of passive adversaries (passive gossipers). For the case of active Byzantine adversaries, many results have been presented by Franklin and Wright [7] , and Wang and Desmedt [20] . Note that Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [10] have also studied fault-tolerant computation in the public multicast model (which can be thought of as the largest possible multirecipient channels) in the presence of active Byzantine adversaries. Specifically, Goldreich, et al. [10] have made an investigation of general fault-tolerant distributed computation in the full-information model. In the full information model no restrictions are made on the computational power of the faulty parties or the information available to them. (Namely, the faulty players may be infinitely powerful and there are no private channels connecting pairs of honest players). In particular, they present efficient two-party protocols for fault-tolerant computation of any bivariate function.
There are many examples of multicast channels (see, e.g., [7] ), such as an Ethernet bus or a token ring. Another example is a shared cryptographic key. By publishing an encrypted message, a participant initiates a multicast to the subset of participants that is able to decrypt it. We present our model in Section II. In Sections III and IV, we study secure message transmission over directed graphs. Section VI is devoted to reliable message transmission over hypergraphs, and Section VII is devoted to secure message transmission over neighbor networks.
II. MODEL
We will abstract away the concrete network structures and consider directed graphs. A directed graph is a graph where all edges have directions. In our discussion, we will also assume that the network modeled by is a synchronous network. In other words, there is a time notion that all involved parties could refer to. For a directed graph and two nodes , throughout this paper, denotes the number of vertex disjoint paths between the two nodes and denotes the number of faults under the control of the adversary. We write to denote the number of elements in the set . We write to indicate that is chosen with respect to the uniform distribution on . Let be a finite field, and let . We define (following [7] , [9] , [16] , [17] ) and
(following [20] ). Note that each authentication key can be used to authenticate one message without revealing any information about any fixed component of the authentication key and that each authentication key can be used to authenticate two messages and without revealing any information about any fixed component of the authentication key. Note that by authenticating a message, we reveal the linear combination of the authentication keys though no information about any fixed component of the authentication key is revealed. We use to indicate sets as well as ordered sets, as should be clear from the context. We will also use a function which maps a variable size (we assume that this variable size is bounded by a pre-given bound) ordered subset of to an image element in a field extension of , and from any image element we can uniquely and efficiently recover the ordered subset.
Let and be two integers such that . A -out-of-secret sharing scheme is a probabilistic function :
with the property that for any and , no information of can be inferred from any entries of , and can be recovered from any entries of . The set of all so obtained possible is called a code and its elements codewords [14] . When we construct a secret sharing scheme for a short message (that is, no sharing scheme exists), we will first map the message space to a bigger finite field (for example, map the message to , where is random). We say that a -out-of-secret sharing scheme can detect errors if given any codeword and any tuple over such that one can detect that is not a codeword. If the code is Maximal Distance Separable, then the maximum value of errors that can be detected is as follows easily from [14] . We say that the -out-of-secret sharing scheme can correct errors if from any and any tuple over with one can recover the secret . If the code is maximal distance separable (MDS), then the maximum value of errors that allows the recovery of the vector is [14] . A -out-of-MDS secret sharing scheme is a -out-of-secret sharing scheme with the property that for any , one can correct errors and simultaneously detect errors (as follows easily by generalizing [14, p. 10]). MDS secret sharing schemes can be constructed from MDS codes, for example, from Reed-Solomon code [15] , using, e.g., the Shamir secret sharing scheme [18] , as basically observed in [15] .
In a message transmission protocol, the sender starts with a message
. At the end of the protocol, the receiver outputs a message . We assume that the message space is a subset of a finite field . We consider two kinds of adversaries. A passive adversary (or gossiper adversary) is an adversary who can only observe the traffic through internal nodes. An active adversary (or Byzantine adversary) is an adversary with unlimited computational power who can control internal nodes. That is, an active adversary will not only listen to the traffic through the controlled nodes, but also control the message sent by those controlled nodes. Both kinds of adversaries are assumed to know the complete protocol specification, message space, and the complete structure of the graph. In this paper, we will not consider a dynamic adversary who could change the nodes it controls from round to round, instead, we will only consider static adversaries. That is, at the start of the protocol, the adversary chooses the faulty nodes. An alternative interpretation is that nodes are static collaborating adversaries.
For any execution of the protocol, let be the adversary's view of the entire protocol. We write to denote the adversary's view when and when the sequence of coin flips used by the adversary is . For two nodes and in a directed graph such that there are node disjoint paths from to , there is a straightforward reliable message transmission from to against a -active adversary: sends the message to via all the paths, and recovers the message by a majority vote.
III. -SECURE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION IN DIRECTED GRAPHS
Our discussion in this section will be concentrated on directed graphs. Dolev, Dwork, Waarts, and Yung [5] addressed the problem of secure message transmissions in a point-to-point network. In particular, they showed that if all channels from to are one-way, then -connectivity is necessary and sufficient for -secure message transmissions from to against a -active adversary. They also showed that if all channels between and are two-way, then -connectivity is necessary and sufficient for -secure message transmissions between and against a -active adversary. In this section, we assume that there are only directed node disjoint paths from to , where . We show that directed node disjoint paths from to are necessary and sufficient to achieve -secure message transmissions from to against a -active adversary.
Franklin and Wright [7] showed that even if all channels between and are two-way, channels between and are still necessary for -reliable (assuming that ) message transmission from to against a -active adversary.
Theorem 3.1: (Franklin and Wright [7] ) Let be a directed graph, , and there are only two-way node disjoint paths between and in . Then -reliable message transmission from to against a -active adversary is impossible for .
In the following, we first show that if there is no directed path from to , then directed paths from to is necessary and sufficient for -secure message transmission from to . . If there are no directed paths from to , then the necessary and sufficient condition for -secure message transmission from to against a -active adversary is that there are directed node disjoint paths from to . Proof: The necessity is proved in Theorem 3.1. Let be the directed node disjoint paths from to . Let be the secret that wants to send to . constructs -out-of-secret shares of . The protocol proceeds from round through round . In each round , we have the following steps. Step , then decides that is a valid share. Otherwise, discards . It is straightforward to see that the adversary will learn at most shares of the -out-of-secret sharing scheme. Thus, the protocol achieves perfect privacy. Now assume that the path contains no faulty nodes, then receives the correct share on path during the round and decides that is a valid share. In other words, receives at least valid shares. For a faulty path , may be different from . The protocol fails if for some faulty path , but decides that is a valid share. In order for the adversary to fail the protocol, during round , the adversary could deliver via the faulty path for appropriately chosen (could be randomly chosen)
. At the same time, the adversary will guarantee that the values received by on all faulty paths would meet the condition . Since the adversary has no control over nonfaulty paths, only with a very small probability, for a nonfaulty path . In other words, will decide that is a valid share only if for a nonfaulty path , which occurs with a very small probability. In order to make the protocol failure probability smaller, one could chose larger finite field .
From the preceding discussion, with high probability, will recover the secret . Thus, the above protocol is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Q.E.D.
By Theorem 3.1, the necessary condition for -secure message transmission from to against a -active adversary is that there are at least node disjoint paths from to and there are at least node disjoint paths in total from to and from to . In the following, we show that this condition is also sufficient. We first show that the condition is sufficient for .
Theorem 3.3:
Let be a directed graph . If there are two directed node disjoint paths and from to , and one directed path (which is node disjoint from and ) from to , then for any , there is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Proof: In the following protocol, -securely transmits a message to . Step 1.
chooses , , and let . For each , sends to via path .
Step 2. Assume that receives via path . checks whether ; , for . If both equations hold, then knows that with high probability the adversary was either passive or not on the paths from to . can recover the secret message, sends "OK" to via the path , and terminates the protocol. Otherwise, one of the equations does not hold and knows that the adversary was on one of the paths from to . In this case, chooses , and sends to via the path . Step 3. If receives an "OK," then terminates the protocol. Otherwise, from the information received via path , decides which path from to is corrupted and recovers 's authentication key . sends to via the uncorrupted path from to . Note that the adversary may control the path and may never receives any message on the path . If this happens, can assume that has received the correct message (thus, we are assuming that the network is a synchronous network).
Step 4.
recovers the message and checks that the authenticator is correct. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, it can be shown that the above protocol is -secure against a -active adversary. Q.E.D. Theorem 3.4: Let be a directed graph, , and
. If there are directed node disjoint paths from to , and directed node disjoint paths ( are node disjoint from ) from to , then for any , there is an efficient -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary. Before we give an efficient -secure message transmission protocol from to , we first demonstrate the underlying idea by giving a nonefficient (exponential in ) -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary. Let be the secret that wants to send to , and be an enumeration of size subsets of ,
Since there are at most -corrupted paths, at least one of the path sets contains all honest paths. If we know that some ( ) contains all nonfaulty paths, we can let and share a random pair for each path in (or ) in . Then we compute , , and use as the authentication key and as the encryption key to communicate the message from to . Note that there is at least one directed path from to in . Since we do not know which path set contains all nonfaulty paths, we have to try all . During our trial on the path set , if the adversary modifies any value during the transmission, the receiver will notice the modification and will discard the received value through . After the entire trial, the receiver will receive the message from the nonfaulty (or is faulty, but the adversary was passive during the run of the protocol). Specifically, the protocol proceeds from round through . In each round , we have the following steps. Step Step 9. If , then computes the secret and terminates the protocol. Otherwise, goes to round . Since there is at least one path set such that contains all nonfaulty paths, accepts a value by the end of the protocol with certainty. It remains to show that if accepts a value, then with high probability, this value is the same as the value sent by . Assume that at the end of the protocol, accepts a value transmitted via the path set ( ). If contains all nonfaulty paths or if the adversary was passive during the protocol run, then obviously accepts the correct secret from . Now assume that contains at least one faulty path with active adversary. If the adversary was active from Step 1 to Step 4, then and share a different authentication key and encryption key. Since there are at most faulty paths, the adversary learns zero information about the encryption key or any component of the authentication key. Thus, the adversary can only let the verifications in Steps 7 and 9 pass with negligible probability. In the same way, if the adversary were active during Steps 5 and 6, the probability that verifications in Steps 7 and 9 pass would be negligible (as can be verified).
Proof: (Proof of Theorem 3.4) We have just presented an exponential time -secure message transmission protocol from to . In the following, we describe a polynomial time -secure message transmission protocol from to . Let be the secret that wants to send to . Our protocol proceeds from round through . Different rounds are dedicated to different scenarios. In particular, we distinguish the following two cases.
1) There are nonfaulty paths from to . 2) There is at least one honest path from to . In the protocol, first constructs -out-ofsecret shares of . For each round , chooses a random authentication key pair for each path and sends it to via . then sends to , via path , the share authenticated with all these authentication keys. If there are at least nonfaulty paths from to , then at the end of round , can recover at least correct shares and the -out-of-secret sharing scheme enables to recover the secret . Specifically, for each round , we have the following steps. Step , if has decided it received valid shares, then recovers the secret from these valid shares and terminates the protocol. If cannot recover the secret at the end of round , then there are less than honest paths from to . Thus, there is at least one honest path from to (note that we have in total paths and at most of them are faulty).
In the following, we describe the remaining rounds of the protocol. In this part of the protocol, with the help of feedback channels from to (note that at least one of these channels is uncorrupted), and can agree on a shared authentication key and encryption key to communicate the message securely from to . In order to use the feedback channels from to , first sends a random -tuple value to via each forward path from to . Specifically, the round has the following steps.
Step 1.
chooses , and sends to via path for each . Note that we abuse our notations by letting for each . Step 2. For each , receives on path from (if no value is received on path , sets it to a default value).
Step 3. For each , chooses and computes . Note that , but we can regard each , , as an element of by summing the components. Now needs to send a random -tuple to on each feedback channel from to . After receiving these random -tuples from , needs to determine whether the received -tuple is the same as the original -tuple sent by (since there is at least one honest feedback channel, at least one of the random -tuples received by is not modified). In order to help to get some hint on this, the techniques that we have used in round to round will be used again. That is, in order for to send a random -tuple to on path ( ), sends random authentication keys to for each path ( ), and sends to via the random -tuple authenticated with all these authentication keys. This is done by the rounds from to . Specifically, in each round ( ), we have the following steps.
Step 1. chooses and .
Step 2.
sends , , and to via path , and , to via path for each .
Step 3.
receives (or substitutes default values) , , and from via path , and from via path for each . According to the values that has received, partitions the paths set into consistent subsets such that for each , all paths in behave in a consistent way. In particular, there is at least one path set that behaved honestly during the rounds from to (though cannot determine which path set was honest, will try to use each of them in a separate way and let to determine which path set is honest). The partition of the paths are done according to the following criteria. For any , , with , , , and , we have 1) ; 2)
; 3)
. For each , let and . computes the number
If
, then decides that is an unacceptable set, otherwise, decides that is an acceptable set. Let for . It is straightforward to check that the following holds.
1) If is an honest feedback channel and , then with high probability, the random -tuples that received on the paths from are not modified. 2) If is an honest feedback channel and , then determines that is an acceptable set. However, all acceptable path sets look the same to and cannot determine whether an acceptable path set contains all honest paths (or paths controlled by passive adversaries). continues the protocol by assuming that each acceptable path set is honest. In other words, assuming that an acceptable path set is honest, from the values received by via paths in , can determine which of the random -tuples it sent to during the round have been received by correctly. Using these "correctly-received-by-" -tuples and the random -tuples received by via paths in , can compute an authentication key and an encryption key to securely send the messages to . If the assumption that is honest is valid, then should be able to compute the same authentication key and the same encryption key. Since at least one of these acceptable path sets is honest, will be able to decrypt the secret message correctly. Specifically, for each round ( ), we have the following steps.
Step 1. If or is an unacceptable set, then go to the next round.
Step 2. computes and as the sum of the two components of . Note that , , and (thus, the adversary learns no information regarding , ).
Step 3. sends to via all paths . Without loss of generality, we assume that could be represented by an element of . Thus, could be interpreted as an element of .
receives from path for .
Step 5. For each , computes (that is, decomposes ) and as the sum of the two components of . Step 6. For each , checks whether . If the equation holds, then computes the secret . If has not received the secret at the end of round , then there exists an uncorrupted path from to and a path set such that and the information that receives from paths in is reliable. Thus, at the end of round , will output a secret . It is not too difficult to check that, with high probability, this secret is the same as . Since for an acceptable , , the adversary learns no information about or or . Thus, it is clear that the protocol achieves perfect privacy. Thus, it is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Corollary 3.5:
Let be a directed graph, , ,
, and there are directed node disjoint paths from to . Then a necessary and sufficient condition for -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary is that there are directed node disjoint paths ( are node disjoint from ) from to . Proof: This follows from Theorems 3.1 and 3.4. Q.E.D.
IV. -SECURE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION IN DIRECTED GRAPHS
In the previous section, we addressed probabilistic reliable message transmission in directed graphs. In this section, we con-sider perfectly reliable message transmission in directed graphs. We will show that if there are directed node disjoint paths from to , then a necessary and sufficient condition for -secure message transmission from to against a -active adversary is that there are directed node disjoint paths from to . Theorem 4.1: Let be a directed graph, . Assume that there are directed node disjoint paths from to . Then a necessary condition for -secure message transmission from to against a -active adversary is that there are directed node disjoint paths from to .
Proof: First we note a simple fact that if there are directed node disjoint paths from to , then can always -reliably send a message to by broadcasting the message via all paths to ( can recover the message reliably by a majority vote).
If , then by the results in [5] , we need directed node disjoint paths from to for -secure message transmission against a -active adversary. If , then again by the results in [5] , we need directed node disjoint paths from to for -reliable (that is, perfectly reliable) message transmission from to against a -active adversary. From now on, we assume that . For a contradiction, we assume that there are only directed node disjoint paths from to , denoted as . Let be the directed node disjoint paths from to .
Let be a -secure message transmission protocol from to . In the following, we will construct a -active adversary to defeat this protocol. The transcripts distribution of is drawn from a probability distribution that depends on the message to be transmitted by , the coin flips of , the coin flips of , the coin flips of the adversary (without loss of generality, we assume that the value will determine the choice of faulty paths controlled by the adversary), and the coin flips of all other honest nodes. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the protocol proceeds in steps, where is silent during even steps and is silent during odd steps (see [5] ).
The strategy of the adversary is as follows. First it uses to choose a value . If , then it uses again to choose directed paths from to and controls the first node on each of these paths. If , then it uses again to choose directed paths from to and controls the first node on each of these paths and the first node on each of the paths from to .Italso uses to choose a message according to the same probability distribution from which the actual message was drawn. In the following, we describe the protocol the adversary will follow.
• Case . The paths behave as a passive adversary. That is, it proceeds according to the protocol . In the following, we assume that the tuple is fixed, , the protocol halts in steps, and the view of is . Let be the values that sends on path in step and . We can view as shares of the message . Similarly, let be the values that receives on path in step and . First, it is straightforward to show that for any paths from to , there is an such that , the adversary controls the paths , and
Due to the fact that is a perfectly private message transmission protocol, from any shares from one cannot recover the secret message . Thus, is at least a -out-ofsecret sharing scheme.
Second, for any paths from to , there is an such that , , the adversary controls the paths , and
Due to the fact that is a perfectly reliable message transmission protocol, any errors in the shares can be corrected by to recover the secret message . In summary, is at least a out-of-secret sharing scheme that can correct errors. By the results in [14] , we know that the maximum number of errors that a -out-of-secret sharing scheme could correct is This is a contradiction, which concludes the proof.
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for -secure message transmissions.
Theorem 4.2:
Let be a directed graph , and
. If there are directed node disjoint paths from to and directed path from to ( are node disjoint from ) then there is an efficient -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Proof: If , then and the results in [5] show that there is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary. If , then . Thus, can send the secret message from any path from to and can reliably and privately recover the message. That is, there is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Assume that , , and the theorem holds for and . We show that the theorem holds for and by induction. In the following, we describe a protocol in which -securely transmits to . There is a detailed case analysis at the end of the protocol. Thus, the reader is referred to read the paragraphs at the end of the protocol at the same time when the reader reads the protocol details. In the following protocol, we often say that reliably sends a value to . This means that broadcasts to via all paths from to and recovers this value using a majority vote. Step 1.
chooses such that .
constructs -out-of-MDS secret shares of . For each , sends to via the path .
Step 3. For each , receives (or sets default) on path . distinguishes the following two cases. 1) There is no error in the received shares. recovers from the received shares, sets , and sends an "OK" back to via all paths for . 2) There are errors in the received shares. sets and sends back to via all paths for .
Step 4. For each , receives an "OK" or from (if anything else is received, sets default value). distinguishes the following cases. 1) received an "OK" from all paths . reliably sends an "OK" to . goes to Step 6. 2) For some reliably sends "path is faulty" to . goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths to transmit to (here we use induction). 3) There exist and with , such that . reliably sends "path or is faulty." goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a active adversary on the paths to transmit to (here we use induction).
Step 5.
distinguishes the following cases. 1) reliably receives an "OK". further distinguishes the following two cases.
1.a) . goes to Step 6.
1.b)
. knows that there are at most errors in the shares . Thus, recovers from these shares by correcting at most errors. goes to Step 6.
2)
reliably receives "path is faulty". In this case, goes to the (0, 0)-secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths and receives the message . 3) reliably receives "path or is faulty." In this case, goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths and receives the message . Step 6.
Step 7. For each , receives (or sets default) on path . distinguishes the following cases. 1) There is no error in the received shares. recovers from the received shares, and sends an "OK" back to via all paths for . computes the secret message and terminates the protocol.
2) There are errors in the received shares and . knows that there are at most errors in the shares . Thus, recovers from these shares by correcting at most errors. sends an "OK" back to via all paths ( ), computes the secret message , and terminates the protocol.
3) There are errors in the received shares and . sends back to via all paths for .
Step 8. For each , receives an "OK" or from (if anything else is received, sets the default value). distinguishes the following cases. 1) received an "OK" from all paths . reliably sends an "OK" to . terminates the protocol. 2) For some reliably sends "path is faulty" to . goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths to transmit to (here we use induction). 3) There exist and with such that . reliably sends "path or is faulty." goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths to transmit to (here we use induction).
Step 9.
distinguishes the following three cases. 1)
reliably receives an "OK." In this case, knows that there are at most errors in the shares . recovers from these shares by correcting at most errors, computes the secret message , and terminates the protocol.
reliably receives "path is faulty." In this case, goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths and receives the message . 3) reliably receives "path or is faulty." In this case, goes to the -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary on the paths and receives the message . Since and , the -out-of-MDS secret sharing scheme in Steps 2 and 3 can be used to detect at most errors without correcting them. If there is no error in the received shares, recovers correctly in Step 3. If detects that there are errors in the received shares, sends back the received shares to via all the to paths in Step 3. If receives an "OK" from all to paths in Step 4, then we can distinguish the following two cases. 1) sends an "OK" to in Step 3. In this case, has recovered correctly in Step 3 and can send to now. Thus, goes to Step 6.
does not send an "OK" to in Step 3. In this case, all the paths from to are corrupted. Thus, there are at most corrupted paths from to . Since , can recover the value by correcting at most errors if can get this additional information that there are at most errors in the received shares. Thus, can send an "OK" to and will learn this information. can then go to Step 6 to send to . In Step 4, if, for some -to--path , receives the value (that is, the received value is the same as the value that has sent in Step 2), then we have confidence that the path is corrupted. The reason is that if sends the value back to , then these values must contain some incorrect components. Thus, will notify of this fact and will receive " is faulty" in Step 5. Thus, goes to the induction step (even if has recovered in Step 3, still needs to go to the induction step since does not know this fact). Note that if we delete the path , then we have at most unknown faulty paths, paths from to , and paths from to . Since there is (by induction) a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary on the paths , and can receive the correct message . If receives an "OK" in Step 5, then either has already recovered in Step 3 or will detect errors in this step ( has not sent an "OK" but received an "OK," that means that all the to paths must be corrupted). If it is the latter case, our preceding analysis shows that there are at most errors in the shares that has received in Step 3. Thus, can recover by correcting at most errors and safely goes to Step 6. If receives "path or is faulty" in Step 5, then goes to the induction step (even if has recovered in Step 3, still needs to go to the induction step since does not know this fact). Note that if we delete the two paths and , then we have at most unknown faulty paths, paths from to , and paths from to . Since there is (by induction) a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary on the paths , and can receive the correct message . Now assume that has recovered and we continue to Step 6. If detects no error in Step 7, then can recover (thus the secret ) safely and terminate the protocol. If detects errors in Step 7, then we can distinguish the following two cases: 1) . In this case, has not asked for help in Step 3 and can ask for help by sending the received shares back to . 2) . In this case, has already asked for help in Step 3 and the adversary may have recovered the value of . Thus, cannot ask for help any more. However, only initiates Step 6 if Case 1 of Step 4 happens. Combining with the fact that , we know that all the paths from to are corrupted. This means that there are at most errors in the shares that receives, and can safely recover by correcting at most errors. Now assume that asks for help in Step 7 and we come to Steps 8 and 9. Similar arguments as for Steps 4 and 5 show that one of the following three cases happens. 1) sends an "OK" to , recovers (therefore as well).
2) and identify one corrupted path and go to the induction step.
3)
and identify two paths so that at least one of them is corrupted, and go to the induction step. We therefore proved that the protocol is -secure against a -active adversary.
V. ALLOWING OVERLAPS BETWEEN FEEDBACK CHANNELS AND FORWARD CHANNELS In the previous section, we proved a necessary and a sufficient condition for -secure message transmission from to . Our sufficient result requires that the paths from to be node disjoint from the paths from to . In this section, we show some results that allows overlaps between these paths. ) then there is an efficient -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Proof: We note that the proof of Theorem 5.1 could not be used here since if we remove (in the induction step) two paths and such that one of them is corrupted, we are not guaranteed that the -active adversary becomes a -active adversary ( may share a node with some other directed paths from to and that node could be corrupted). First we describe the proof informally. In the protocol, tries to transmit the secret message to assuming that one of the directed paths from to is not corrupted. This is done by running concurrent subprotocols in phase one, in each subprotocol uses one of the directed paths from to to send some feedback information to . Since there are directed node disjoint paths from to and there are at most corrupted paths, will be guaranteed to receive the correct secret. and execute the following protocol on the path set for each directed path from to . First chooses and sends shares of to via the paths using a -out-of-MDS secret sharing scheme. If there is no error in the received shares, recovers . Otherwise, needs help from and sends the received shares back to via the to path . The problem is as follows: may receive help even if has never asked for it. However, can detect this. Therefore, always works with on such a protocol and recovers the correct . Then sends using a -out-of-MDS secret sharing scheme. If there is no error in the received shares of , has found the secret and can terminate the protocol. If cannot correct these errors, needs to continue the protocol. In this situation, distinguishes the following two cases. 1) has not asked for help in the transmission of . can ask for help now and will then recover the secret . 2) has asked for help in the transmission of . In this case, cannot ask for help (otherwise, the adversary may learn both the values of and and thus may recover the secret). The subprotocol needs to be restarted (that is, constructs different and for and sends them to again). Each time when and restart this subprotocol, sends the shares of and only via these "noncorrupted" paths from to . The "noncorrupted" paths are computed from the feedbacks that has received from the path . If is not corrupted, then the computation is reliable. However, if is corrupted, then the computation is unreliable. Since there is at least one noncorrupted path from to , recovers the secret from the subprotocol running on the path set . If asks for help in the transmission of , then both and "identify" the corrupted paths from and according to the information that sends to via the path . If dishonest paths from to have been (correctly or incorrectly) identified at the restart of the subprotocol, uses a -out-of-MDS secret sharing scheme. This MDS secret sharing scheme will only be used for error detection (or message recovery in the case that no error occurs), thus, it can be used to detect errors. Due to the fact that this MDS secret sharing scheme cannot detect errors, we need to ensure that will never use incorrectly identified paths from to since otherwise could compute the incorrect "secret." This is easy to address by having detect whether the path from to is dishonest or not. This is done by having reliably send to what received via the path . Since a -out-of-MDS secret sharing scheme can detect errors, both and identify at least dishonest paths from to in the first run of the subprotocol. During each following run of the subprotocol, will either recover the secret message (when no error occurs) or detect at least one corrupted path from to ( could also detect the corrupted path from to according to the information received on the path ). Thus, the subprotocol will be restarted at most times. Now we present the entire protocol formally.
Step 1. For each directed path from to , and run the subprotocol between Step 2 and Step 10 (the subprotocols for the paths could be run in parallel).
Step 2. sets and . sets and .
Step 3. Let . chooses , and constructs -out-of-MDS secret shares of . For each , sends to via the path .
Step 4. For each , receives from via the path . distinguishes the following two cases. 1) can recover . recovers only if there is no error in the received shares. sends an "OK" to via the path . 2) cannot recover . sends to via the path .
distinguishes the following two cases. 1)
receives an "OK" via the path . reliably sends an "OK" to . to via the path .
Step 8. For each , receives from via the path . distinguishes the following two cases. 1) can recover . recovers only if there is no error in the received shares. sends an "OK" to via the path . 2) cannot recover . For this situation we need to distinguish two cases.
2.a) sent an "OK" to in Step 4. That is, has not asked for help to recover . Then can ask for help now. sends to via the path . 2.b) sent the received shares to in Step 4. That is, has asked for help to recover . Then cannot ask for help now. sends "continue to the next round" to via the path .
receives an "OK" via the path . reliably sends an "OK" to .
2)
receives "continue to the next round" via the path . sets , reliably sends "continue to the next round" to , and goes to Step 3.
3)
receives (or sets default values if the received values are in invalid format). sets ,
, and reliably sends and to .
Step 10.
distinguishes the following three cases. 1) reliably receives an "OK" from . If sent an "OK" to in Step 8, then has recovered the secret. terminates the entire protocol. Otherwise, terminates this subprotocol. 2) reliably receives "continue to the next round."
If sent "continue to the next round" to in Step 8, then sets and goes to Step 3. Otherwise, terminates this subprotocol. 3) reliably receives and from . If for all , then sets , recovers from , computes the secret , and terminates the entire protocol. Otherwise, terminates this subprotocol. It is straightforward to show that at the beginning of each run of the subprotocol between Step 2 and Step 10, both and have the same sets of , that is, at Step 2. From the analysis before the above protocol, it is straightforward that the above protocol is a -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary.
VI. SECURE MESSAGE TRANSMISSIONS IN HYPERGRAPHS
Applications of hypergraphs in secure communications have been studied by Franklin and Yung in [8] . A hypergraph is a pair where is the node set and is the hyperedge set. Each hyperedge is a pair where and is a subset of . In a hypergraph, we assume that any message sent by a node will be received identically by all nodes in , whether or not is faulty, and all parties outside of learn nothing about the content of the message.
Let be two nodes of the hypergraph . We say that there is a "direct link" from node to node if there exists a hyperedge such that . We say that there is an "undirected link" from to if there is a directed link from to or a directed link from to . If there is a directed (undirected) link from to for every , , then we say that there is a "directed path" ("undirected path") from to . and are "strongly -connected" ("weakly -connected") in the hypergraph if for all , , there remains a directed (undirected) path from to after the removal of and all hyperedges such that . Franklin and Yung [8] showed that reliable and private communication from to is possible against a -passive adversary if and only if and are strongly -connected and weakly -connected. It should be noted that and are strongly -connected does not necessarily mean that and are strongly -connected.
Following Franklin and Yung [8] , and, Franklin and Wright [7] , we consider multicast as our only communication primitive in this section. A message that is multicast by any node in a hypergraph is received by all nodes with privacy (that is, nodes not in learn nothing about what was sent) and authentication (that is, nodes in are guaranteed to receive the value that was multicast and to know which node multicast it). We assume that all nodes in the hypergraph know the complete protocol specification and the complete structure of the hypergraph. Definition 6.1: Let be a hypergraph, be distinct nodes of , and . , are -separable in if there is a node set with at most nodes such that any directed path from to goes through at least one node in . We say that separates , .
Remark: Note that there is no straightforward relationship between strong connectivity and separability in hypergraphs. Proof: This follows directly from the maximum-flow minimum-cut theorem in classical graph theory. For details, see, e.g., [6] .
Q.E.D. Theorem 6.3: Let be a hypergraph, be distinct nodes of , and . A necessary and sufficient condition for reliable message transmission from to against a -active adversary is that and are not -separable in .
Proof: First assume that and cannot be separated by a -node set. By Theorem 6.2, there are directed node disjoint paths from to in . Thus, reliable message transmission from to is possible.
Next assume that and can be separated by a -node set in . We shall show that reliable message transmission is impossible. Suppose that is a message transmission protocol from to and let be a -node separation of and with and each having at most nodes. Let be the message that transmits. The adversary will attempt to maintain a simulation of the possible behavior of by executing for message . The strategy of the adversary is to flip a coin and then, depending on the outcome, decide which set of or to control. Let be the chosen set. In each execution step of the transmission protocol, the adversary causes each node in to follow the protocol as if the protocol were transmitting the message . This simulation succeeds with nonzero probability. Since does not know whether or , at the end of the protocol cannot decide whether has transmitted or if the adversary succeeds. Thus, with nonzero probability, the reliability is not achieved.
Q.E.D. Theorem 6.3 gives a sufficient and necessary condition for achieving reliable message transmission against a -active adversary over hypergraphs. In the following example, we show that this condition is not sufficient for achieving privacy against a -active adversary (indeed, even not for a -passive adversary).
Example 1:
Let be the hypergraph in Fig. 1 where and
Then the nodes and are not -separable in . Theorem 6.3 shows that reliable message transmission from to is possible against a -active adversary. However, the hypergraph is not weakly -connected (the removal of the node and the removal of the corresponding hyperedges will disconnect and ). Thus, the result by Franklin and Yung [8] shows that private message transmission from to is not possible against a -passive adversary. Theorem 6.4: Let and and be two nodes in a hypergraph satisfying the following conditions. 1) and are not -separable in . 2) and are not -separable in . 3) and are strongly -connected in .
Then there is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Proof: Assume that the conditions of the theorem are satisfied. For each -node subset set of , let be a directed path from to which contains no node from . Let and . Then transmits the message to using the following protocol.
Step 1. For each , chooses a random pair , and transmits this pair to via the path .
Step 2. For each , receives a pair from via the path .
Step 3. For each , chooses a random and computes .
reliably transmits to .
reliably receives the value from .
Step 6.
computes the key index set and the shared secret .
Step 7.
reliably transmits to , where is the secret message. Step 8.
reliably receives the value from . computes the secret , and decrypts the message . It is possible that but for some . However this probability is negligible. Thus, the above protocol is reliable with high probability. Since and are strongly -connected in , there is a pair such that reliably reaches and the adversary cannot infer any information of from its view. Thus, the above protocol is -secure against a -active adversary if one chooses sufficiently large .
The results in Sections III and IV show that the condition in Theorem 6.4 is not necessary. For example, for a graph with directed node disjoint paths from to , and -directed node disjoint path from to , and are separable in . But according to Theorem 3.4, there is a -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
VII. SECURE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION OVER NEIGHBOR NETWORKS

A. Definitions
A special case of the hypergraph is the neighbor network. A neighbor network is a graph . In a neighbor network, a node is called a neighbor of another node if there is an edge . In a neighbor network, we assume that any message sent by a node will be received identically by all its neighbors, whether or not is faulty, and all parties except for 's neighbors learn nothing about the content of the message. For a neighbor network and two nodes in it, Franklin and Wright [7] and Wang and Desmedt [20] showed that if there are multicast lines (that is, paths with disjoint neighborhoods) between and and there are at most malicious (Byzantine style) processors, then the condition is necessary and sufficient for achieving efficient probabilistically reliable and perfect private communication.
For each neighbor network , there is a hypergraph which is equivalent to in functionality. is defined by letting be the set of hyperedges where and is the set of neighbors of . Let and be two nodes in a neighbor network . We have the following definitions. ) such that all nodes on have no neighbor in . It is easy to check that the following relationships hold.
weak
-connectivity -neighbor-connectivity weak -hyper-connectivity -connectivity
In the following examples, we show that these implications are strict.
Example 2: Let be the graph in Fig. 2 where and Then it is straightforward to check that is -connected but not weakly -hyper-connected.
Example 3:
Let be the graph in Fig. 3 where and Then it is straightforward to check that and are weakly -hyper-connected but not -neighbor-connected.
Example 4:
Let be the graph in Fig. 4 where and Then it is straightforward to check that and are -neighborconnected but not weakly -connected.
Example 2 shows that -connectivity does not necessarily imply weak -hyper-connectivity. Example 3 shows that weak -hyper-connectivity does not necessarily imply -neighbor-connectivity. Example 4 shows that -neighbor connectivity does not necessarily imply weak -connectivity for some .
B. -Secure Message Transmission Over Neighbor Networks
Wang and Desmedt [20] have given a sufficient condition for achieving -security message transmission against a -active adversary over neighbor networks. In this section, we show that their condition is not necessary. Theorem 7.1: (Wang and Desmedt [20] ) If and are weakly -connected for some , then there is an efficient -secure message transmission between and .
The condition in Theorem 7.1 is not necessary. For example, the neighbor network in Example 3 is not -neighbor-connected, thus, not weakly -connected. In the following, we present a -secure message transmission protocol against a -active adversary from to for the neighbor network of Example 3. In the protocol, we will often say that a node sends a value to its neighbor node . This could be achieved in a neighbor network by the following procedures.
1) broadcasts a value to all its neighbors.
2)
broadcasts to all of its neighbors.
3)
recovers the message using the value . In this procedure, will receive the value secretly only if and have no common neighbors (or they have no collaborating faulty neighbors).
Message Transmission Protocol for Neighbor Network in Example 3:
chooses two random pairs and . sends to and to .
chooses a random pair . sends to and to . Step 4.
chooses a random pair . sends to and to .
Step 5. From the messages received from and , computes and .
Step 6. From the messages received from and , computes and .
chooses a random , computes , and . Using the probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol of Franklin and Wright [7], transmits to .
Step 8. Let be the message received by in the last step, computes the key index set . also computes the shared secret .
Step 9. Using the probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol of Franklin and Wright [7], transmits to , where is the secret message.
Step 10. Let be the message that received in the last step. computes the shared secret , and decrypts the message . Using [7] , it is straightforward to check that the above protocol is an efficient -secure message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary.
Example 1 shows that for a general hypergraph, the existence of a reliable message transmission protocol does not imply the existence of a private message transmission protocol. We show that this is true for probabilistic reliability and perfect privacy in neighbor networks also. Then there is a probabilistic reliable message transmission protocol from to against a -active adversary in . But there is no private message transmission from to against a -passive (or -active) adversary in . Proof: It is straightforward to check that is not weakly -hyper-connected. Indeed, in the hypergraph of , the removal of node and the removal of the corresponding hyperedges will disconnect and completely. Thus, Franklin and Yung's result in [8] shows that there is no private message transmission protocol against to . It is also straightforward to check that Franklin and Wright's [7] reliable message transmission protocol against a -active adversary works for the two paths and . Q.E.D.
Though weak -hyper-connectivity is a necessary condition for achieving probabilistically reliable and perfectly private message transmission against a -active adversary, we do not know whether this condition is sufficient. We conjecture that there is no probabilistically reliable and perfectly private message transmission protocol against a -active adversary for the weakly -hyper-connected neighbor network in Fig. 6 , where and Note that in order to prove or refute our conjecture, it is sufficient to show whether there is a probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol against a -active adversary for the neighbor network. For this specific neighbor network, the trick in our previous protocol could be used to convert any probabilistically reliable message transmission protocol to a probabilistically reliable and perfectly private message transmission protocol against a -active adversary.
